

ФІЛОСОФІЯ ІСТОРІЇ

UDC 300.3+301+930.1

DOI <https://doi.org/10.24195/spj1561-1264.2020.4.12>**Dobroliubska Yuliia Andriivna**

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor,

Head of the Department of World History and Methodology of Science
South Ukrainian National Pedagogical University named after K. D. Ushynsky

26 Staroportofrankovskaya str., Odesa, Ukraine

ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3564-854X

THE RHETORICAL SUBSYSTEM OF HANS KELLNER'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

The postmodernist approach focuses on maintaining referentiality, which is threatened with almost complete extinction under the influence of growing interest in rhetoric. Hans Kellner proceeds from White's distinction between history and chronicle: in contrast to chronicle, history must always be narrative, that is, have a known "beginning-middle-end" structure. In the narrative is the necessary selection and organization of facts, and the description of facts is figuratively coded so that their interpretation becomes a "harvest" of their meanings. H. Kellner believes that modern philosophy of history should carry out a general re-certification of rhetorical philosophy of history, that the structuring of rhetorical codes is a fundamental characteristic of the discursive work of the historian. He balances on the distinction between history and literature, fact and fiction, and emphasizes that postmodernist philosophy of history, studying issues of historical representation, is united by an interest in the text of history, and the text can only be obtained by "distorting" history. The text should be seen as a means of historical analysis required by historical discourse, and at the same time as an adaptation by which discourse declares itself to be represented by reality. In general, according to H. Kellner, the most important fact of modern historical knowledge is that there are a huge number of different discourses and this avalanche is mainly aimed at studying the past. Modern historical discourse, according to H. Kellner, should not only change our view of the subject, but also add new information and formulate new questions. This ultimately leads to a better understanding and representation of the past. Modern historical discourse does not have a memorializing function, so the risk of historical representation cannot be eliminated, as there are no special forms of representation corresponding to complex historical events such as the Holocaust. Therefore, depending on the type of events, H. Kellner believes, it is necessary to choose the most adequate forms of representation and work in all the diversity and variability of modern historical discourse, in which the dominant, according to H. Kellner, is literary, rhetorical discourse.

H. Kellner's philosophy of history is a rhetorical subsystem of the epistemological postmodernist subsystem of the philosophy of history. Its concept is a rhetorical approach to philosophical and historical research, the structure – literary cognitive structures, the substrate – the category of "reader's letter" and the author's intention.

Key words: *philosophy of history, system of philosophy of history, post-modern subsystem, cognitive strategy, referentiality, rhetoric, textualist argument.*

Problem. During the 1980s–1990s, the postmodern philosophy of history was supplemented by the names of H. Kellner, S. Bann, D. La Capra, L. Gossman, and many others. They focused on the problems of the referentiality and rhetoric of the historical text, the correlation of the text and the context, the historical representation, the professional identity of the historian. According to M. Kukartseva's classification, White's followers form the direction of so-called deconstructivism in postmodernity [1]. Such a division, in our opinion, has no good reason that we will try to prove with a summary of the theories and views of one of the famous and recognized philosophers of history – Hans Kellner.

Purpose. Following the textualist argument, postmodern philosophers of history “transmute much (if not all) of the referential side of history solely to its representational and narrative (interpretative) side, which inevitably destroys the imperative of semantic and eventual materiality, of materiality, eventuality” [2, p. 449]. According to the postmodernists themselves, such a procedure of transmutation is absolutely necessary in philosophical and historical constructions, since it gives the “power over the reader” and opens up to modern historiography “pluralism of new possibilities”, even if all the signs of objectivity of the conducted research disappear. In this situation, history risks its uniqueness for the sake of “referentiality” and “clear and transparent historiographic style”; just to “make the facts speak for themselves”.

In this context, a debate about the nature and effectiveness of the referential approach to narrative is unfolding among postmodern philosophers of history, with the majority advocating the preservation of the referentiality that, under the influence of the growing interest in rhetoric, is almost completely extinct.

Results and discussion. Hans Kellner proceeds in his reflections on White’s distinction between history and chronicle: unlike the chronicle, history must always be narratively narrated, that is, have a known beginning-to-end structure. Kellner emphasizes that the necessary selection and organization of facts takes place in the narrative, and the description of the facts is figuratively coded so that their interpretation becomes the “harvest” of their meanings. “There are other sources in the formation of narratives, taken not from the obvious but from a language that represents the obvious at the semantic level” [3, p. 54]. H. Kellner believes that modern philosophy of history must carry out a general re-certification of the rhetorical philosophy of history. Rhetoric, in his view, is the conduit of freedom, and logic is the tyranny of modern history. H. Kellner praises the “magic imperialism of rhetoric” [3, p. 229] and considers that the structuring of rhetorical codes is a fundamental characteristic of the historian’s discursive work. He is inclined even to refer I. Kant and Z. Freud to the theorists of rhetoric, and believes that in modern philosophy of history, only one issue is not resolved to the end: where is the basis and the beginning of rhetorical ciphers – in the language of narrative or in the nature of man. Historical texts only take on the desired form in connection with the construction of many rhetorical structures. Rhetoric is needed, it is an uprising “against the authoritarian discourse of reality”, “truth and reality” are today, H. Kellner believes, a dangerous weapon of our time [3, p. 190].

In his view, White’s emphasis on the significance of imagination in historiographical work marked not only a new round of debates in historical science, but, more importantly, emphasized the power and legitimacy of imagination in the profession of historian itself. The need for constructing rhetorical structures is inspired, in Kellner’s view, by our in-depth understanding of the distinction between what we mean and the texts we write. However, there is a small problem here: “Tropologically read is a very difficult thing, but being read tropologically is almost an insoluble task” [3, p. 301]. It is in this sense that, in the works of Derrida and P. de Man, among other things, it is declared impossible not only to read but also to write. The excessive apology of rhetoric led Derrida and de Man to the contrary: to formulate fundamental theoretical concepts that could make theoretical history possible, but instead threatened to destroy it. What happened in White’s essay “The Moment of the Absurd”: Rapture Turns History into Literature [4, p. 237].

H. Kellner agrees that modern literary theories determine the intellectual basis of history and the philosophy of history, that the parallels between realism in history, literature and the fine arts have become the basis of historical work, and, with all sympathy for rhetoric, tries to avoid it. In his view, history can and should use literary concepts, but still remain history and always identify as such. The means of fulfilling this requirement is to maintain and maintain referentiality. The fascination with the literary aspects of historical work, pantextualism, leads to the disappearance of referentiality, that is, the loss of a sense of objectivity of real relations in the world, and in the world of history in particular.

It should be noted that H. Kellner himself balances on the verge of distancing history and literature, fact and fiction, and practically comes close to denying referentiality in the general flow of historio-

graphical reflections. Sensing this, H. Kellner focuses on the phenomenon of “textualism”, which, he believes, virtually annexes all modern historiography and raises a number of serious problems. The main one, H. Kellner believes, is the problem of historical representation as a problem of reproducing primary semantic content in secondary forms of text. In *Kellner Language*, Kellner emphasizes that postmodernist philosophy of history, by examining issues of historical representation, is united by interest in the text of history, and that text can only be obtained through “distortion”. A story is always a historian’s construct, but if we focus solely on the text without noticing the real content, we will get a description of the historical events “distorted”. According to H. Kellner, the text should be regarded as a means of historical analysis, demanded by historical discourse, and at the same time as an adaptation by which discourse proclaims itself as represented reality.

In this regard, Kellner’s solution to the problem of Holocaust representation, one of the most sought after topics in history, is of great interest. and the philosophy of history. This interest is inspired by postmodernism with its attention to the study of “small” situations, fragments of something more general. Due to the unprecedented scale and means of annihilation for the modern civilization, the difficulty and often insolubility of the ethical side of the case (one cannot destroy the opinion of some of the people about the unconditional correctness of the action caused by the Nazis) representations of similar historical events. H. Kellner addressed this issue in the article “What will never happen again happens again” [5]. He begins by saying that the words “never again is now” in themselves represent “a powerful expression of contradictions and discontinuities, paradoxes, and avenues of representation. <...> The notion of non-repetition (never again) is filled with eternal present (is now) and raises questions. of a temporal nature that is difficult to answer” [5, p. 127].

According to H. Kellner, no formal linguistic understanding of these words can do more than merely hint at their possible belonging to a particular type of linguistic discourse. And revealing the semantic content of these words is a huge task. Suffice it to say that this phrase, despite its non-imperative linguistic discourse, forces “someone” to decide that “something” should not be repeated again. This “someone” is a Jew at first, and the “something” is the Holocaust. H. Kellner believes that the Bible’s imperative of memory, *Zakhor*, is involved in these words: “And you will remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God brought you out from there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord commanded you, Your God, celebrate the Sabbath day” (5:15) [6].

This command to remember a past event is framed as an imperative to observe and keep the day holy, the ritual present as a figure of eternity. Earlier biblical requirements for observing the Sabbath, such as Exodus, do not contain the historical memory imperative. It appeared as a kind of a replay point: “remember Saturday, again”. This repeated historical memory, (the recitation-definition) that is recounted by each Jewish Passover, has a specific function – to remind the Jews of the past to avoid its recurrence. The tension between the call to celebrate and the command to remember, evoked by the words “never again”, is, H. Kellner believes, the essence of the problem of historical representation of the Holocaust. The word “now” (“again”) creates the present over events that should not be repeated, hence the misrepresentations of these events. In the representation of the past, there is often a threat of anti-historicism as a result of the unintentional distortion of historical credibility due to differences in the mentality of people of different historical eras; attribution to past events of such values and roles that they did not have before the events of the present. The immediate past is difficult to represent because it is “still a life of its own”.

In his time, A. Danto, exploring the structure of narrative proposals, formulated a thesis about the fundamental incompleteness of the historical interpretation of the past. In contrast, Michael Oakeshott believed that the past of history is an “irreversible present”, even if it is of little or no value [7] at the moment. The past is simply the present, because it is part of our collective experience, and it is always in the present.

The past, according to M. Oakeshott, should generally become a present before it becomes and becomes a historical fact. If you accept Oakeshott’s thesis, then the problem of historical representation will disappear, since it is easier to represent the present. V. Mezhyuev, for example, writes:

“To be a historical fact means to have <...> the value of the present <...> the main question that excites the philosopher in his reflections on history – who we are in history and what is present in the endless turn of historical events” [8, p. 86]. It is from these positions that the followers of post-modernism approach the problem of historical representation, although in the future it is difficult not to fall prey to their own individual (scientific, aesthetic and social) tastes and preferences, and, based only on them, to choose the most important and necessary.

This is what H. Kellner is referring to when it comes to the power of the needs of today that weigh on the process of historical representation. He believes that if we are aware of the reality of these needs and the reality of the desires of the present in the representation of the past, then we are open to the contrast between the historical weight of the present events and the historical weight of the desires of the present, which cannot be expressed in words. At the same time, this contrast, such as a sense of balance between the Holocaust itself and any interest in it, leads to a search for a limited representation of the Holocaust, and the limitation of representation is, in turn, a limitation of the desire of the present.

On the other hand, the historical weight of the Holocaust adds to the libidinal aspects of representation: the sense of guilt arises in any case, it is only a complaint, eyewitness testimony or a style of presentation. The first is banal, the second is unreliable, and the third is too aesthetic. We are a historical society, so in order to live in the memory of the community, the Holocaust must be represented historically. To do this, it was ritualistic to remind the Holocaust once a year, as a reminder on Pace to honor the Sabbath. “Memorization should be in language” [5, p. 129] because if reminders take the form of photographs or museum objects, their meaning will still depend on the discourse that articulates them. Language, linguistic, colloquial, discursive reminders destroy memory, leave only facts. H. Kellner understands that there is some risk of giving the Holocaust a “free discussion of discourse”, but he fears that this risk is equal to his potential success in the Holocaust’s historical representation.

Before explaining his point of view, H. Kellner suggests looking at other options. First, to the memories of eyewitnesses. Listening to eyewitnesses, according to H. Kellner, is identical to the process of viewing photos described by R. Bart. Someone looks at the photo of Jerome Bonaparte and thinks that his eyes have seen the emperor, and someone listens to the eyewitness of Babi Yar and thinks that his eyes have seen the shooting of thousands of people. The text in this case is written not on the page but on the body. Can you then read about the Holocaust? H. Kellner believes that this circumstance exposes the paradoxical, self-destructive nature of the Holocaust representation, which requires special efforts to preserve it. Secondly, H. White considers it indispensable that there is a need for limited discourse about such historical events, namely, the denial of literalism: something must be silenced and presented as “something” as a form of language. To this end, White chose a special linguistic form – the passive – in grammar of ancient Greek as a possible way of evading the subject’s unwanted invasion of an event [9, p. 48]. In this linguistic form, it is assumed that the subject is already involved in the action (event) that he wants to represent. The rhetorical nature of the liability confirms the disappearance of the author or any view that exists outside the text. According to White (and H. Kellner agrees here), the ability of a particular form of language to represent historical events is a sign of a new type of philosophy of history.

H. Kellner is convinced that the Holocaust has a distinctly modernist nature, and the real effect of its representation can only be achieved within historical discourse. Therefore, in Kellner’s view, for the Holocaust representation, a chronological type of presentation where events actually speak for themselves can be a form of representation. This type of Holocaust representation was proposed by Beryl Lang [10]. In his view, literal representation constitutes an adequate understanding of events. Lang believes that the figurative work of the imagination of the historian conflicts with the individuality of historical events, and that the chronicles reduce the risk of any historical representation and are the basis of historiography, that is, logically historical narrative always goes after the chronicle.

H. Kellner is convinced that White did not consider the historical narrative to the fullest extent possible. A lost element in all discussions about the historical representation of the Holocaust is the reader himself. The reader is “anyone who has experience of representing some part of the past:

a Holocaust researcher or student who learns about it at school or the media, or just someone who has a vague sense that “everyone knows” that Hitler made the Jews “something bad”. Any deliberate representation of the Holocaust will have an appropriate audience” [5, p. 140]. This audience is always the imaginary and often unconscious construction of the author himself; he always accurately grasps the purposeful power of representation. “If the author is successful in the work, it is generally because he can invent in his imagination an audience that he knows not from ordinary life, but from the experience of previous writers who invented his audience, in turn, using information from previous authors, and so to the beginning of the written narrative” [11, p. 78].

Conclusions. We summarize the elements of innovation and the preservation of tradition in Kellner’s ideas. Creating events means creating a reader who can recognize the event “as an event” and, when presented, can follow its logic according to the conditions of its reading. The reader himself designs the events, often in opposition to the official actions and intentions of their principled participants. The reader knows the plot that constitutes events of a certain type, and refuses to acknowledge for the events anything else that happens within the known description. The reader always imitates the notion of historical identity. For example, the Second World War was named precisely because the reader had experience of a similar historical story (the First World War). Similarly, the armed conflict in Korea became the Korean War, despite all attempts by US diplomacy to portray it as a police action, similarly to the Vietnam and Chechen war. The reader follows his or her individual and social experience, knowledge, which in this case can be called a sense of historical identity. The formation of the reader’s attitude to the event is influenced not by the immediate impression of the event, which may not be at all, but by the impression of a purely cognitive, a priori, which can still be called secondary historical creativity. The image of this event is as if it is “planting” on an invariant image of “something like that” and the act of identification is taking place. And since the history of mankind reproduces a great number of repetitions of transformations (farce and tragedy) of original events, in themselves small, the philosophical-aesthetic conception of historical reconstruction and representation offered by H. Kellner is not so implausible.

In the case of the Holocaust, the genocide of one people by another is a rare phenomenon in world history, so the associative reorientation of the reader’s consciousness from a particular subject to its generalized essence is not difficult here. Rhetorical techniques – epithets, metaphors, allegories and others sublimate the process of Holocaust representation from external objectivity to its historical and cultural construction. In addition, the Holocaust consists of separate events – Babi Yar, the Warsaw Ghetto, Auschwitz, etc. The essence of such an event, of course, lies not in the depiction of its individual forms and parts, but in the filling of what is called the general picture – the Holocaust. It is based on the imaginative systems of Japanese Kangi poetry and the painting of the *suibokug*, the elements of the *gozan bunghei* (Five Mountains art). In these systems, which originate in Taoism, the main influence on creativity is not a visual-spatial impression, but a literary impression. The actual observation of nature is not as important as the contemplation of this nature in the “picture of the heart”, when without seeing things, one can penetrate into their essence. In this sense, the creation of events is equal to the creation of the reader, as the creation of a work of art is equal to the creation of its viewer and vice versa. We think that H. Kellner, in creating the concept of the letter reader, followed the logic in something similar to just described.

However, no author can be completely sure of his or her reader. H. Kellner emphasizes that the rhetoric ensures the reader’s loyalty to a certain vision of the subject (comedy, tragedy), but the existence of social codes cannot be ignored. They are given to better understand the nature of the events described, as well as to regulate the relationships between the various components of historical work: factual material, the author’s intent, the discourse that controls the author’s intention, and the reader’s expectations of the audience. Together, the formal possibilities of rhetoric and the possibility of social codes, a kind of referential reference, create the real credibility of the events represented. Especially those events, that seem at all incompatible with reality, such as the Holocaust. In this sense, the word «never again is now» is a rhetorical expression of our transcendent belief in the eradication of evil, and this is what makes the Holocaust one of the central events of recent history.

In general, H. Kellner believes, the most important fact of modern historical knowledge is that it has a huge number of different discourses, and this avalanche is mainly aimed at exploring the past. Contemporary historical discourse, H. Kellner believes, should not simply change our view of the subject, add new information and formulate new questions. “With every successful historical work, things must change if the profession works the way it should” [5, p. 141]. In the end, it leads to a better understanding and representation of the past. Contemporary historical discourse does not send memorializing functions, so one cannot escape the risk of historical representation, since there are no special forms of representation corresponding to complex historical events such as the Holocaust. Therefore, depending on the type of events, H. Kellner believes, we must choose the most appropriate forms of representation and work in all the variety and variability of contemporary historical discourse, in which, in Kellner’s view, literary, rhetorical discourse is dominant.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Кукарцева М.А. Современная философия истории США. Иваново : Ивановский государственный университет, 1998. 215 с.
2. Berkhofer R.F. The Challenge of Poetics to (Normal) Historical Practice. *Poetics Today*. 1988. № 8. P. 435–452.
3. Kellner H. Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked. Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. 339 p.
4. White H. The Absurdist Moment in Contemporary Literary Theory. *Tropics of Discourse* / H. White. Baltimore, 1978. P. 223–290.
5. Kellner H. “Never Again” is Now. *History and Theory*. 1994. № 2. P. 127–144.
6. Біблія, або Книги Святого Письма Старого і Нового Заповіту: із мови давньоєврейської й грецької на українську перекладена. 988–1988. Ювілейне видання з нагоди тисячоліття християнства в Україні / пер. І.І. Огієнка. Київ : Місійне товариство «Нове життя Україна, Кемпус Крусейд фор Крайст», 1992. 1528 с.
7. Oakeshott M. Experience and its Modes. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1985. 346 p.
8. Межуев В.М. Философия истории и историческая наука. *Вопросы философии*. 1994. № 4. С. 74–86.
9. White H. Historical Employment and the Problem of Truth. *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution”* / ed. by S. Friedlander. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1992. P. 37–54.
10. Lang B. *The Future of the Holocaust: Between History and Memory*. Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1999. 198 p.
11. Ong W.J. The Writer’s Audience Is Always a Fiction. *Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture*. Ithaca : Cornell UP, 1977. P. 53–81.

REFERENCES

1. Kukartseva, M.A. (1998). *Sovremennaya filosofiya istorii SSHA* [Contemporary philosophy of US history]. Ivanovo: Ivanovskiy gosudarstvennyy universitet [in Russian].
2. Berkhofer, R.F. (1988). The Challenge of Poetics to (Normal) Historical Practice. *Poetics Today*, no. 8, pp. 435–452 [in English].
3. Kellner, H. (1989). Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press [in English].
4. White, H. (1978). The Absurdist Moment in Contemporary Literary Theory. *Tropics of Discourse* / H. White. Baltimore, pp. 223–290 [in English].
5. Kellner, H. (1994). “Never Again” is Now. *History and Theory*, no. 2, pp. 127–144 [in English].
6. Ohiienko, I.I. (transl.) (1992). *Bibliia, abo Knyhy Sviatoho Pysma Staroho i Novoho Zapovitu: iz movy davnoievreiskoi y hretskoi na ukrainsku perekladena*. 988–1988. Yuvileine vydannia z nahody tysiacholittia khrystianstva v Ukraini [The Bible, or the Books of the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments: Translated from the Hebrew and Greek languages into Ukrainian. 988–1988. Anniversary edition on the occasion of the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine]. Kyiv: Misiine tovarystvo “Nove zhytia Ukraina, Kempus Kruseid for Kraist” [in Ukrainian].

7. Oakeshott, M. (1985). *Experience and its Modes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [in English].
8. Mezhuiev, V.M. (1994). *Filosofiya istorii i istoricheskaya nauka* [Philosophy of History and Historical Science]. *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 4, pp. 74–86 [in Russian].
9. White, H. (1992). Historical Employment and the Problem of Truth. *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution"* / ed. by S. Friedlander. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 37–54 [in English].
10. Lang, B. (1999). *The Future of the Holocaust: Between History and Memory*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press [in English].
11. Ong, W.J. (1977). The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction. *Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, pp. 53–81 [in English].

Добролюбська Юлія Андріївна

доктор філософських наук, професор,

завідувач кафедри всесвітньої історії та методології науки

Південноукраїнського національного педагогічного університету імені К. Д. Ушинського

вул. Старопортофранківська 26, Одеса, Україна

ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3564-854X

РИТОРИЧНА СУБСИСТЕМА ФІЛОСОФІЇ ІСТОРІЇ ХАНСА КЕЛЛНЕРА

Постмодерністський підхід сконцентровується на тому, щоб зберегти референціальність, якій під впливом наростаючого інтересу до риторики загрожує майже повне зникнення. Ханс Келлнер виходить зі встановленої Уайтом дистинкції історії та хроніки: на відміну від хроніки історія завжди має бути оформлена наративно, тобто мати відому структуру «початок – середина – кінець». У наративі відбувається необхідна селекція й організація фактів, а опис фактів фігуративно закодований так, що їх інтерпретація стає «жнивими» їх значень. Х. Келлнер вважає, що сучасна філософія історії повинна здійснити загальну ре-атестацію риторичної філософії історії, а також що структуризація риторичних кодів є фундаментальною характеристикою дискурсивної роботи історика. Він балансує на межі дистинкції історії й літератури, факту і вигадки та підкреслює, що постмодерністська філософія історії під час вивчення питання історичної репрезентації об'єднана інтересом до тексту історії, а текст може бути отриманий тільки завдяки «викривленню» історії. Текст повинен розглядатися як засіб історичного аналізу, що вимагається історичним дискурсом, і водночас як пристосування, яким дискурс проголошує себе репрезентованим реальності. Загалом, як вважає Х. Келлнер, найбільш важливий факт сучасного історичного знання полягає в тому, що в ньому існує величезна кількість різних дискурсів, і ця лавина переважно спрямована на дослідження минулого. Сучасний історичний дискурс, на переконання Х. Келлнера, повинен не просто змінювати наш погляд на предмет, а й додавати нову інформацію та формулювати нові питання. Саме це зрештою веде до кращого розуміння й репрезентації минулого. Сучасний історичний дискурс не виконує меморалізуючі функції, тому позбавитися від ризику історичної репрезентації не можна, оскільки немає спеціальних форм репрезентації, що відповідають складним історичним подіям, подібним до Голокосту. Тому необхідно, як вважає Х. Келлнер, залежно від типу подій вибирати найбільш адекватні форми репрезентації та працювати в усьому різноманітті й мінливості сучасного історичного дискурсу, у якому домінуючим, на думку вченого, є все-таки літературний, риторичний дискурс.

Філософія історії Х. Келлнера є риторичною субсистемою епістемологічної постмодерністської підсистеми філософії історії. Її концептом є риторичний підхід до філософсько-історичних досліджень, структурою – літературознавчі когнітивні структури, а субстратом – категорії «письмо читача» та «авторська інтенція».

Ключові слова: філософія історії, система філософії історії, постмодерністська субсистема, когнітивна стратегія, референціальність, риторика, текстуальний аргумент.