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УДК 165.6
DOI https://doi.org/10.24195/spj1561-1264.2023.4.1

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THE ROLE OF THE CONCEPT OF FALLIBILISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY

The relevance of research. *Looking at the dichotomous picture of philosophy, characterizing fallibility as the "golden mean" would be appropriate. In this sense, fallibility can be seen as a creative approach to balancing between dogmatism, which exaggerates the idea of absolute truth, and skepticism, which emphasizes the impossibility of reaching the truth in the epistemological system. Moreover, fallibility, which does not deny the possibility of making mistakes in the process of acquiring knowledge, holds a superior position compared to others in terms of being an ideology open to criticism.*

Essentially emerging as an epistemological argument starting from modern philosophy, fallibility was introduced into philosophical-epistemological circulation by C. Peirce in the 19th century and formed the core of K. Popper's falsification method in the 20th century. In the 21st century, philosophers such as B. Reed, S. Cohen, and S. Haak have made fallibilism a central topic of research, and it continues to maintain its validity today. In this sense, the concept of fallibilism plays the role of an important "epistemological actor" in the modern philosophical system due to its specific position. Thus, the philosophical-epistemological analysis of fallibilism and the creation of a general concept as a result is one of the most relevant philosophical problems for today.

The purpose of this article *is to analyze the philosophical and epistemological aspects of the fallibilism.*

Research methods. *In the process of researching the problem, the following scientific methods were used: analysis and synthesis, comparison*

Key words: *fallibility, dogmatism, skepticism, error, falsification, absolutism.*

Introduction to the problem. The expression "Nisi fallit me animus" almost directly reveals the essence of fallibility. Translated from Latin as "if my reason does not deceive me," it emphasizes, on the one hand, the certainty that one knows the truth and, on the other hand, points out that our reason and perception can deceive us [5, p. 138]. This thesis, which etymologically means "error", "mistake" and is widely used in the field of epistemology, does not grant absolute truth status to any form of knowledge, taking into account the relativity of the knowledge of the "mankind".

Although the term fallibility was first introduced into scientific-philosophical circulation by Charles Sanders Peirce, who said " none of our beliefs are safeguarded from error", and has only recently come to the fore, we can say that this idea has a deep historical background, as seen in the case of the ancient Greek philosopher Carneades, the empiricist Francis Bacon, the skeptical Pyrrhonists and logicians, as well as René Descartes, the father of modern philosophy.

Francis Bacon begins the New Organon by criticizing two extreme views of the epistemological debate about the extent to which the world can be understood. That is, on the one hand there were the dogmatists who claimed that all the fundamental laws of nature had been discovered and that this would have a devastating effect on the search for truth, and on the other hand there were the hard skeptics who claimed that nothing could be known in general. According to Bacon, both radical approaches "did great harm to philosophy and science. In addition to creating false beliefs in people,

they have also succeeded in hindering and stopping research." Instead, Bacon partnered with representatives of pre-Socratic philosophy who carefully walked the path between dogmatism and skepticism. Because they did not try to dogmatize about everything, because they did not despair of understanding the truth, because they understood how difficult the path to truth is. Sometimes they complained about how "dark" everything was, but they did not give up their quest for true knowledge [3, pp. 1-3].

Descartes' philosophy reveals a similar situation when examined. Thus, the modern philosophy of knowledge, emerging to purify truth from all authoritative doctrines and errors, also from the pressure of all kinds of dogmatism, has been redirected completely contrary in its aim by taking intelligence as the sole path, serving as a reference point and control factor to reach the truth [10, p. 122]. Descartes, who used the skeptical method to eliminate not only errors but also claims of the absoluteness of knowledge, already indicated the contradictory nature of modern epistemology. Thus, rationalism, which defines the liberation of the knowledge acquisition process from dogmatic elements as its ultimate ideal and the meaning of its existence, is confronted with a paradoxical situation when it accepts unquestioned intelligence as a universal lawgiver. In conclusion, Cartesian philosophy, unable to maintain its critical- fallibilist position by evaluating knowledge as a special type of rational absolutism, found its place in the history of philosophical thought, much like Cartesian dogmatism.

However, the role of Cartesian skepticism in the formation of the fallibilist approach is undeniable, as indicated in the introduction. As mentioned earlier, the expression "Nisi fallit me animus" is often associated with Cartesian philosophy, defining existence as an illusion and emphasizing the inevitability of error in cognitive processes. The term "animus" here can be translated as both mind and soul. In the proposed second version, the deceptive force that misleads us is presented as the "diabolical soul" or "Descartes' demon".

Fallibilism as a internal approach between skepticism and dogmatism. As epistemologist Suzanne Haak has noted, "dogmatism is too optimistic, skepticism too pessimistic... and Peirce's fallibilism, which says that any belief can be false, occupies an intermediate epistemological position" [7, p. 172].

In this sense, fallibilism reflects the dichotomous nature of modern philosophy of science [11, p. 44]. We can say that Peirce's fallibility is the "golden mean" between these two extreme and radical views. At the same time, in accordance with the philosophical ideology he represented, Peirce was favorable to the exploitation and use of any theory or judgment until it turned out to be proven mistaken. For this reason, Peirce's approach is often referred to in much literature as "pragmatic fallibility". On the other hand, if Descartes valued science as a form of knowledge, for Peirce knowledge or truth is the result of action. In contrast to the Cartesian principle that associates truth with a purely rational, a priori knowledge, Peirce's misleading position is that the path to knowledge or truth involves a system of propositions that contain fallacies. According to Peirce, this idea is related to the method of iteration used in a mathematical system to make probabilistic claims and test them over and over again to arrive at the accurate conclusion. That is, the path to truth may start from a false assumption, but we approach it by eliminating and checking these errors at each subsequent step.

It is important to note a nuance that distinguishes fallibilism from skepticism. Skeptics are doubtful about the notion of first principles on which the whole system of knowledge is "built", while fallibilists oppose the notion of ultimate truth and describe our knowledge as a snake that periodically "changes its skin". Proponents of fallibility take the view that no matter how well-founded any reasoning or argument is, there is always a margin or possibility of error. Emphasizing the fallibility of human intelligence, fallibilists also point out that no rational justification is sufficient to ensure the truth and therefore the reality of a proposition. In this context, Peirce emphasized the doxastic nature of human intelligence.

Much of the research in the field of cognitive psychology shows that the way people evaluate and interpret new claims is directly related to their worldview system. As Francis Bacon emphasized, "when the human intellect adopts one idea, it encourages other ideas to conform to and support it". In this sense, our established belief system acts as a "selective impulse" in the process of approving or rejecting new views. That is, the subject tends to pick and choose the evidence that confirms

their beliefs. From this point of view, ideas that are in line with their own views are accepted, while ideas that are contrary to the subject's views are criticized and excluded. This process creates a kind of "illusion of confirmation" [15, p. 59]. Thus, the subject's knowledge system, as Aron Ansel puts it, is subject to errors as a result of the influence of a number of cognitive and emotional tendencies called "irrational sources". Stereotypes, our tendency to distort judgments in incompatibility with our knowledge in line with personal and group interests, and our dogmatic approaches are among these sources. All these listed factors are "guarantors" of creating a new knowledge system that is vulnerable to errors and mistakes and therefore not transparent [2, p. 411].

As a result, doubts about human judgment arise. According to John Stuart Mill, they act as "mists that hide our ignorance from us". As Ansel notes, "our judgments are surrounded by cognitive and emotional stereotypes that make it difficult and, in many cases, practically impossible to think clearly and objectively about the issues that affect our interests" [2, p. 418]. In many cases we think we are neutral and objective, but in fact we distort arguments to fit the conclusions we want to achieve. In reality, we suffer from what psychologists call the "illusion of objectivity". As the philosopher Nathan Ballantine says, "doing our best to be impartial will lead us to think that we are not mistaken, but that it is unreasonable to rely on this part" [4, p. 131].

In addition to the pessimistic views we have listed, we also encounter more optimistic tendencies as an alternative approach to this issue. Thus, in this context, cognitive stereotypes and their corresponding errors are interpreted as "bounded rationality" (G. Gigerenzer) or "instrumental rationality" (J. Brunero, N. Kolodny) rather than as purely irrational concepts [8, p. 1141]. Given that we have limited cognitive resources, our errors and misconceptions should be treated as an integral part of our rational behavior. On the other hand, seemingly irrational beliefs should be considered as a consequence of instrumental rationalism as they serve as a means to achieve one's goals.

At first glance, the cause of fallibility can be seen as the human factor or its emotional, mental and biological aspects. In this case, how will the situation change if what B. Russell called "medical restrictions" (nutrition, rest, sleep, etc.) are removed from a typical person's life and instead an "omniscient" individual with an idealized rational intelligence is created? Therefore, since these individuals have idealized rational intelligence, the concept of "doxastic voluntarism" (the effect of the belief system formed by the subject on the basis of free choices on the process of knowledge formation) would be of no importance to them. Because in this case, only rational arguments would be seen as the source of truth. But again, the subject will not be able to escape the effects of "Descartes' demon". In other words, although there is an ideal intelligence, the above contradictory point arises here as well, since the arguments that make up the system of knowledge are mutually supportive. In this case, as Karl Plantinga points out, truth and its subjects will become the prisoners of "impulsive evidence" [5, pp. 131-132].

Theory of knowledge as a version of fallibilism. Although also used in moral philosophy, the term fallibility is mainly used in epistemology. In his article "How to Think About Fallibilism" Baron Reed states that almost every new theory of knowledge today is a version of fallibilism [19, p. 143]. By constantly testing and improving scientific theories, researchers confirm that our knowledge and beliefs are not immune to fallibility, that is, the possibility of error. Ronald Schwartz writes in "Knowledge and Fallibilism": "The history of fallibilism is a narrative of the realization that, although people occasionally invent brilliant ideas, they can never be perfect or know what they believe to be necessarily true... The fallibilists differ from other views about human nature and knowledge. The main difference is that they are willing to accept that human cognition is not unlimited and imperfect. According to fallibilists, the knowledge or beliefs of any age can be replaced by new and better ideas of the next age" [20, p. 18]. In this context, Peirce often compared fallibilism with the concept of "ancient truth", which has undergone great development and evolution up to the present day.

The fact that the development of science is conditioned by the revision of many theories, sometimes radically changing them, sometimes refuting them and replacing them with another theory, makes it possible to strengthen the position of misleading views. In this sense, fundamentalism, which claims the infallibility of a particular system of knowledge or belief and thus opposes fallibilism, faces

a number of challenges. These challenges can be attributed to the relativity of rational judgments, the social nature of science, the proof of scientific evidence through others, and the theoretical basis of observation. In the process of accepting any concrete scientific claim as fact and transforming it into theory, the facts before it serves as a foundation, a "pillar". As a result, this leads to an infinite number of dogmatic truths that prove each other. In Einstein's words, no single piece of evidence can conclusively confirm my theory, and even a single argument against it can disprove it.

On the other hand, in the observation process, the subject's "prior" knowledge and preconceived notions and assumptions inevitably influence this process. In this respect, since the process loses its "neutral" character, the absoluteness of the results of empirical methods is unacceptable [16, pp. 14-17]. As mentioned above, Bacon envisioned science as Scylla and Charybdis – Odysseus caught between rationalism and skepticism [21]. But as a result of a misunderstanding of his method, a new dogma emerged. In short, the method proposed by the "father of empiricism" to overcome dogmatism became the source of dogmatic belief itself.

As we mentioned, fallibilism was basically a concept that expressed the epistemological position of the representatives of post positivism that emerged in the philosophical field from the 60s and 70s of the 20th century. Thus, post positivism is a philosophical school that opposes positivism as well as fundamentalism, rationalism and empiricism. Post positivism is a philosophical-ideological orientation that rejects the idea of the perfection of human intelligence and knowledge and the idea that our knowledge is based on absolute postulates; on the contrary, it accepts fallibility and error as an inevitable fact of life and therefore of scientific and philosophical research. Karl Popper, one of the leading representatives of this school, writes in his work "Conjectures and Refutations" that there is no final, absolute source of knowledge, that each new source, each new reasoning is acceptable and every one of them is open to criticism. This is because our knowledge is, and always will be, provisional in nature. And we have the possibility of refuting, not proving, our claims. When we look at the history of human ideas, we see that many ideas that were considered true were later distorted. From this point of view, trying to prove a theory or justify the truth of a belief is a big mistake, it is trying to do something logically impossible [14, p. 94]. Popper sees fallibility as the main driving force of development. In Peirce's terms, fallibility is a requirement of durability. According to Peirce, any research result should be accepted as a possibility or hypothesis, not as an absolute fact, since it carries elements of the future [1, p. 48].

In her article "Fallibilism and Rational Belief", Ruth Weintraub points out that human intelligence is fallible for three "prima facie" reasons:

1) Bayes' theorem is equated with dogmatism. The basic essence of this theorem is to avoid uncertainty and inaccuracy as much as possible by comparing newly acquired information with the "old" knowledge we have. In short, Bayes' theorem means the expression of the truth or probability of error of a certain idea through a mathematical-statistical test. According to Weintraub, there is a fine line between dogmatism and Bayes' theorem. Therefore, a person who misinterprets and uses this theorem tends to accept his/her previous beliefs or knowledge as dogma. In this context, the philosopher emphasizes the role of open-mindedness, criticism and rational-scientific skepticism in approaching existing and potential knowledge in order to move away from dogmatism.

2) The second problem is that the certainty of the practical consequences of any theorem or claim leads to its irrationality.

3) Confidence in the truth of a claim must coincide with the reliability of the methods used to obtain it. Therefore, in the research process, when the subject turns to misleading or confusing methods, the accuracy of the final result is questioned [21, p. 251].

As we have mentioned, fallibility is an epistemological approach that states that no belief, thesis, theory or opinion can ever be justified in a precise, rational way. Therefore, it is clear from the definition that one of the main targets of fallibilists' criticism is the idea of absolutizing epistemological justification. In this context, Professor Richard Feldman approached the issue from a different angle. According to Feldman, even if S (the subject) is mistaken in believing p (the judgment), it is sometimes possible for S to know that p is true [5, p. 134]. In this case, it should be noted that epistemic

modals come to the fore in a way compared to alethic modals. Of course, epistemic standards such as epistemological justification and collection of evidence are also taken into account in this process.

Stuart Cohen examines the relationship between fallibility and skepticism in his article "How to be a Fallibilist". "S (the subject) can have knowledge Q by trusting or believing the claim R (the cause). But the truth of R here is probable, not absolute" [6, p. 91] is the basic principle of his fallibilist approach. Cohen sees fallibilism as the ideal way to balance knowledge and doubt. Thus, fallibilists manage to avoid skeptical conclusions by relying on the concept of probability rather than the concept of absoluteness or certainty. Thus, they can be wrong, and they manage to avoid skeptical conclusions by relying on the concept of probability rather than the concept of absoluteness or certainty. Because when we look at the standards of truth or knowledge, we can see that they are based on extremely strict and unchanging rules and evidence. In this case, in order for any view to be given the status of truth, it should not contain elements such as contradiction and doubt. Cohen, on the other hand, states that such a viewpoint will eventually face hard skepticism, that all "infallibilist theories are doomed to a skeptical end" [6, p.91], and proposes a softer and "flexible" model of knowledge and information. In other words, the term probable truth rather than absolute truth underpins his philosophical-epistemological position.

It is important to note that Cohen's fallibilism draws its intellectual foundation from the theory of American philosopher Richard Karp Jeffrey, the founder of radical probabilistic philosophy. In his book “Probability and the Art of Judgment”, published in 1992, Jeffrey challenges traditional epistemological views by rejecting absolutism as the most important element of knowledge and proposes the acceptance of probability as the fundamental component of knowledge. [9, p. 11]. This approach serves as an alternative to stereotypical standards of truth. Professor Clayton Littlejohn, a contemporary cognitivist and epistemologist, in his article "Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism" looked at the issue from a perspective consistent with Feldman and Cohen's approach.

According to Clayton, "Fallibilism is the doctrine that a subject can know p even if the evidence he offers for knowing p is logically valid for non-p" [12, p. 603]. That is, even if the subject does not have absolute or fully justified knowledge to know the truth of something, the final conclusion is likely to be true. According to Clayton's fallibilist approach, errors should not be treated as obstacles but as elements of the overall knowledge system. In this sense, Clayton's position is similar to that of Feldman and Cohen, who support the idea that "the path to true knowledge sometimes passes through errors or incomplete reasoning. In his article, Clayton also addressed the connection between fallibility and the notion of concessive or conditional knowledge, which is widely used in epistemology and philosophy of language. Concessive knowledge is understood as knowledge that has the properties of relativity and conditionality and is also open to criticism. Concessional knowledge is also characterized as a kind of "epistemological humility" that takes potential fallacies into account. In this sense, privileged knowledge acts as a consequence of fallibilism, which recognizes the limits of human perception and therefore does not imagine reality as infallible. Clayton thus took a kind of critical position towards Professor Jeffrey Stanley's description of consensual knowledge as a problem to be overcome, with no possibility of truth, in an article with a similar theme [12, p. 618].

In his 1988 article, S. Cohen states that " fallibilism is almost universally accepted in epistemology". Following him, the American philosopher Harvey Siegel declared in 1997 that "we are all fallibilists now". Thus, the idea of fallibility, which has become a subject of debate, has its partners, as well as philosophical positions that oppose it. The American philosopher Laurence Bonjour, who criticized fallibilism, expressed his views against fallibilism in his work "The Myth of Knowledge". In general, according to Bonjour, there is no degree of knowledge, that is, knowledge either exists or does not exist. In this context, he divides theories of knowledge into two categories: fallibilism as a weak theory of knowledge and the Cartesian concept as a strong theory of knowledge. From his point of view, fallibilism cannot be seen as an intellectually important concept of knowledge. This is because, according to this view, the concept of knowledge does not have a well-defined definition and knowledge is systematised on the basis of evidence that is considered satisfactory. In this sense, fallibility is a philosophical myth. Bonjour justifies his definition of fallibility as a myth with two arguments:

First, the ambiguity of the level of justification. According to fallibilism, the level of reasoning is more important for knowledge than absoluteness. According to Bonjour, the main question arises when determining this level. For example, how much empirical evidence, experience and expert opinion is needed to claim that I know any scientific hypothesis? In other words, how reliable should these analyses be, 70%, 85% or 99%? In this context, fallibility does not provide a specific criterion or threshold for the level of justification, thus creating confusion.

The second is the importance of the determined level. Let us assume that the problem mentioned above has been solved. At this point, we face a new obstacle. Why should this defined level be accepted as a limit, a criterion for presenting a claim as knowledge or truth? [8, p. 1120] So, for example, if a statement based on statistics in scientific research is considered 95 per cent true, the question arises as to why this value is not 94 or 96 per cent (in which case the statement is considered false).

On the other hand, according to the philosopher, since the concept of truth based on Cartesian rationalism requires a certain standard of certainty for knowledge, this standard is impossible to meet in most cases. As a result, Descartes' position emphasizes that we have very little knowledge, which often leads him to be seen as a kind of scepticism and to favour a fallible conception of knowledge. On the contrary, fallibility, as we have mentioned, does not see the possibility of error as an obstacle on the way to truth, but as a passage in many cases. Bonjour approaches this issue from a critical point of view. To put his interpretation in metaphorical language, we can say that at the end of the " stairway of knowledge" which is built on probabilistic claims and fallacies, we miraculously encounter the truth as if we had suddenly entered a magical level. In short, our beliefs or assumptions suddenly turn into evidence [8, pp. 1121-1122]. In other words, if the above problem is formulated as $0 + 0 + 0 = 1$ with bivalent logic, replacing the wrong belief with 0 and the correct belief with 1, we are faced with an unacceptable and paradoxical situation. An example of this is the Gettier problem.

If we analyze the philosophical views mentioned in general, we can agree with James Pyron's view, who defines fallibilist theorists as "people who do not absolutely guarantee the truth of our beliefs that we perceive as true, but who nevertheless believe that we can have truth and knowledge despite errors" [18, p. 518]. This approach is of interest to many philosophers. Because, as we have emphasized above, the end of infallibilist views is scepticism, and therefore fallibilism is considered to be the epistemologically ideal alternative to avoid the effects that will arise. According to epistemologist Stephen Hetherington, fallibilism is a more realistic position that takes into account the cognitive limitations of human cognition and defines knowledge as an accessible concept.

Although skepticism and fallibilism are diametrically opposed philosophical approaches, Professor Michael Hennon of the University of Nottingham proposes the term "fallibilistic skepticism" based on their combination. In this case, fallibility ceases to be a risk factor for skepticism. According to Hennon, the main idea of fallibilist scepticism can be characterised in two ways:

First, the level of justification of knowledge is not always certain. That is, some of the evidence presented to prove the truth of a certain claim in a certain period may be refuted in another period.

Secondly, many knowledge claims in daily use are generally accepted to be false.

Considering science as a dynamic process, K. Popper opposes the understanding of absolute and infallible knowledge based on the classical ideal. Popper emphasized fallibilism in his work, stating that all theories and laws should be considered as hypothetical and conjunctive (speculative) concepts, because all our theories are and will remain probable, hypothesis and assumption. In this sense, we can say that Popper's fallibility is more radical than Peirce's. According to Popper, the principle of fallibility is the basis of the critical method, which he sees as the most ideal method of discovering the truth today. It is this method that provides scientific objectivity by creating the conditions for criticizing dominant dogmas despite all obstacles.

Therefore, according to Popper, scientific objectivity is not the result of the work of a single scientist, but rather the social result of friend-enemy relations, mutual criticism, co-operation and competition [17]. That is, scientific truth is not only the epistemological result of the cognitive activity of separate scientists, but also the socially significant result obtained in the process of interaction of the scientific community. According to Popper, truth in the objective sense is its correspondence

with facts and its interaction with falsehood. From this point of view, according to Popper, fallibilism is a concept that believes in the existence of truth but, on the other hand, does not absolutize the possibility that we can reach it. Even if we always try to find the truth, there will always be the possibility of error and we can never be sure of the results. However, at this point, Popper states that we should never lose faith in human intelligence and underestimate its power. From this perspective, the essence of Popper's method of falsification is to re-emphasize the relationship between truth and error.

Imre Lakatos, the philosopher who first highlighted the importance of the absolutism-falsifiability dichotomy in the philosophy of mathematics, also linked this attitude to the debate between skepticism and dogmatism. Adapting his own fallibilist position to Popper's "critical fallibilism", Lakatos' philosophical work served as an impetus for researchers acting as an alternative to fundamentalist schools [13].

Conclusion. In modern philosophical literature we can find different definitions of fallibility. Metaphorically, fallibilism is the attitude of a philosopher who says "with a Socratic smile" that "we should not be wrong about one thing, all theories can be wrong" [13]. According to S. Haak, fallibility is related to the human tendency to make mistakes. Referring to P. Ernest Lakatos, fallibility is the theoretical possibility that any accepted knowledge, including mathematical knowledge, loses its modal status as truth. Thus, we can say that fallibilism is an approach that considers it necessary to improve scientific knowledge and to criticize, refute and propose new hypotheses about the possibility and relative nature of scientific knowledge. In short, fallibilists, believing that there is no final and immutable limit to knowledge, refuse to look for the reference point of Archimedes, who said, "Give me a fulcrum and I will move the earth".

The dual relationship between absolutism and fallibilism, which treats our knowledge, especially our mathematically based knowledge, as immutable, infallible and absolute, is one of the topics of interest in the philosophical field. Absolutism has been the object of research in Hegel's metaphysical system, as well as the idealist teachings of B. Bosanquet, B. Bradley, D. Royce, and the pragmatism of W. James, who combined absolutism with empiricism and gave it an epistemological status. The absolutism-falsifiability dichotomy is often compared in the context of the schools of apriorism and naturalism, which represent opposing positions.

Taking all approaches into account, we can conclude that fallibilism is a synthetic philosophical view that is linked to skepticism and relativism and at the same time embodies their positive features. In a sense, fallibilism is an element of the epistemological system that prefers the deductive method constructed by considering the methods of verification and falsification and does not exclude the existence of truth. From this point of view, it would be correct to consider fallibilism as a "soft skepticism" that liberates our consciousness from the chains of the illusion of absolutism and opens a more progressive and optimistic perspective on knowledge. In a word, according to fallibilism, it is more appropriate to characterize the concept of truth not as a quality of knowledge, but as a guide to knowledge, as a "regulative ideal" in I. Kant's words.

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РОЛЬ КОНЦЕПЦІЇ ФАЛІБІЛІЗМУ В ЕПІСТЕМОЛОГІЇ

Актуальність дослідження. *Розглядаючи дихотомічну картину філософії, доречно охарактеризувати хибність як «золоту середину». У цьому сенсі помилковість можна розглядати як творчий підхід до балансування між догматизмом, що перебільшує ідею абсолютної істини, та скептицизмом, що підкреслює неможливість досягнення істини в епістемологічній системі. Поза тим, помилковість не заперечує можливості скоєння помилок у процесі отримання знань, займає вигідніше становище від інших ідеологій з погляду відкритості до критики. Виникнувши як епістемологічний аргумент, починаючи з сучасної філософії, помилковість була введена у філософсько-епістемологічний обіг К. Пірсом у XIX столітті і стала основою методу фальсифікації К. Поппера у XX столітті. У XXI столітті такі філософи, як Б. Рід, С. Коен, С. Хаак, зробили фалібілізм центральною темою досліджень, і він продовжує зберігати свою актуальність і сьогодні. У цьому сенсі концепція фалібілізму через свою специфічну позицію грає роль важливого «епістемологічного актора» в сучасній філософській системі. Таким чином, філософсько-епістемологічний аналіз фалібілізму та створення в результаті цього загальної концепції є однією з найбільш актуальних філософських проблем на сьогоднішній день.*

Мета цієї статті*: Аналіз філософських та епістемологічних аспектів фалібілізму.* ***Методи дослідження****. У процесі дослідження проблеми використовувалися такі наукові методи: аналіз та синтез, порівняння.*

Ключові слова**:** *фалібілізм, догматизм, скептицизм, хибна думка, фальсифікація, абсолютизм.*