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PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS OF PERSONAL FREEDOM: BETWEEN SELF-ALIENATION AND AUTHENTICITY

*The **relevance of the issue** of personal freedom is driven by a systemic crisis of human existence, where globalization, digital, and sociocultural transformations intensify pressure on individual autonomy. Modern society creates soft mechanisms of discipline and control that are subtly internalized by individuals, leading to their self-alienation. The **aim** of the study is to conceptualize freedom as a set of practices directed toward escaping the influence of the sociocultural environment, overcoming self-alienation, and unfolding personal potential in an authentic mode of being. The **methodological framework** is grounded in M. Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power, H. Marcuse's ideas on the surplus-repression of instincts in society, P. Bourdieu's concept of habitus, and E. Fromm's distinction between «freedom to» and «freedom from». M. Heidegger's concept of existentials is heuristically valuable for differentiating between the inauthentic and authentic modes of existence, providing an ontological framework where the authentic dimension of Dasein is correlated with the actualization of personhood. As a **result** of the study, it was revealed that sociocultural practices root the individual in the system as a mechanism of escape from negative «freedom from»: fleeing the disorientation caused by the loss of organic connection with nature, human beings submit to the system, which leads to their self-alienation. In contrast, existential practices rely on positive «freedom to» and overcome this alienation through spontaneous creative activity. In line with M. Heidegger's ontology, they enable the individual to overcome the dominance of the system, shifting their mode of being from inauthenticity to authenticity. Existential practices are conditioned by transformative reflection and the reinterpretation of behavioral patterns. It is hypothesized that, as practices of self-creation, existential practices are capable of exerting a reverse transformational impact on sociocultural conditions, thereby enabling the achievement of positive freedom at the systemic level as well.*

Key words: *personal freedom, free will, existential practices, existentials, sociocultural practices, disciplinary power, authenticity, freedom from, freedom to, habitus.*

Introduction. In the history of philosophy, freedom as a category is inextricably linked with the category of the will. In particular, G. W. F. Hegel writes: «Heaviness constitutes the body and is the body. The same is the case with freedom and the will, since that which is free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, while freedom is actual only as will, as subject» [5, p. 26]. At the same time, what defines the will is that it is «*the free will which wills the free will*» [5, p. 46, emphasis in original]. This implies that a free individual is one whose will is intentionally directed toward freedom as an end in itself. However, the historical development of Western civilization has led to a fundamental substitution of the concept of freedom: it acquired the meaning of a certain privilege granted by society as an ideological construct represented by power institutions. As a result, the alienation of individuals from their freedom as a volitional intention occurs, while their will is artificially and forcibly restricted to the sphere of the permissible.

H. Marcuse refers to the state described above as «democratic unfreedom» [8, p. 3], linking it directly to technical progress, which granted civilization significant comforts, thereby making human beings dependent on them: «Under the conditions of a rising standard of living, non-conformity with the system

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itself appears to be socially useless…» [8, p. 4]. Furthermore, it can be assumed that while being in a comfortable relationship with the system and functioning within it, the individual gradually falls into a co-relation or codependency through the internalization of it. Thus, a «one-dimensional man» emerges, whose thoughts and actions are «redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension» [8, p. 14]. This signifies that through the satisfaction of certain needs, the individual loses the very intention to be free, transforming oneself into a part of the dominant system.

However, as a growing trend toward various forms of totalitarianism is observed globally today, the problem of personal freedom reveals its fundamental nature with renewed force. Moreover, in an era of hybrid warfare often perpetrated by neototalitarian regimes – such as Russia's war against Ukraine – technological progress as an achievement of humanity turns against itself not only through information manipulation, but also through long-range weapons. It becomes increasingly obvious that today, not only the human mind is in danger, but also another ontic structure that enables human existence – the body. At the same time, an alternative example of totalitarianism in the contemporary world is Afghanistan, led by the radical Islamist Taliban movement following their takeover of power and the restoration of the self-proclaimed Islamic Emirate. In this case, corporeality emerges simultaneously as an object and an instrument of subjugation to the system through the phenomenon of apartheid: women face bans on education, work, moving around freely, and presence in the public sphere – as well as on presence itself as unveiled visibility – while for men, physical presentation is strictly regulated.

The overt subjugation of the individual through the imposition of restrictions on the human body within radical power dynamics invites reflection on the potential consequences of a similar, albeit less obvious, mechanism in democratic systems. It stands to reason that the failure to cultivate and sustain personal freedom in society inevitably leads to totalitarianism, which underscores the necessity of investigating freedom's practical dimension today and the prospects for its development.

The aim and objectives of the article are to conceptualize personal freedom as an aggregate of practices oriented toward transcending the influence of the sociocultural environment, overcoming self-alienation, and transforming personal potential into active self-creation within an authentic mode of being. To this end, it is necessary to delineate sociocultural and existential practices as those inherent in the states of «escape from freedom» and positive freedom, respectively.

The research methodology is grounded in H. Marcuse's interpretation of Freudian metapsychology (specifically his concept of the surplus-repression of instincts in society), M. Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power, P. Bourdieu's concept of habitus, and E. Fromm's distinction between positive («freedom to») and negative («freedom from») freedom. M. Heidegger's concept of existentials is heuristically valuable, as it continues the line of ontological differentiation between the inauthentic mode of human existence and authentic Dasein, interpreted here as the horizon of authentic personhood. Additionally, G. W. F. Hegel's definition of the link between freedom and free will, alongside N. Khamitov's conceptualization of freedom as a pivotal existential structure, are methodologically significant.

Results of the study. E. Fromm considers freedom primarily in its psychological dimension, associating it with the immanent structure of human existence. He writes: «*human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable*. Freedom is here used not in its positive sense of "freedom to" but in its negative sense of "freedom from", namely freedom from instinctual determination of his actions» [4, p. 48, emphasis in original]. According to E. Fromm, the negativity of such freedom stems from the fact that, having lost their organic connection with nature, individuals find themselves in a situation of existential loneliness, uncertainty, and powerlessness before the burden of their own independence: «people have lost those ties which gave them security, this lag makes freedom an unbearable burden. It then becomes identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks meaning and direction. Powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some kind of relationship to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom» [4, p. 52].

In contrast to negative freedom, E. Fromm proposes the concept of positive freedom – «freedom to» – which implies active self-realization, responsibility, and creative affirmation of the individual in

the world: «*positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality*» [4, p. 284, emphasis in original]. Of particular note is the concept of spontaneity, which in this context differentiates mere human existence from authentic personhood: «Spontaneous activity is free activity of the self and implies, psychologically, what the Latin root of the word, *sponte*, means literally: of one's free will» [4, p. 284, emphasis in original].

Based on E. Fromm's logic, human beings are inherently independent of instincts, but only to the extent that they are inclined toward a different kind of dependence – namely, submission resulting from the escape from this freedom. At the same time, the personhood is the embodiment of spontaneity: that is, an unpredictable and unconditioned, active, and creative independence in its absolute form. One of the prerequisites for the actualization of spontaneity is the self's awareness of integrity and «the elimination of the split between "reason" and "nature"; for only if man does not repress essential parts of his self, only if he has become transparent to himself, and only if the different spheres of life have reached a fundamental integration, is spontaneous activity possible» [4, p. 285]. It can be assumed that this primarily concerns the equal cultivation of the spiritual, psychic, and corporeal dimensions of human existence in individual activity. Crucial to this study is also the assumption that herein lies the root of the problem of personal freedom in the modern democratic world, which is characterized by a radical rationalization in the name of the «performance principle» [7, p. 44].

To delve deeper into the problem of human alienation from nature, it is worth turning to H. Marcuse, who examines it through S. Freud's metapsychology. He proposes the concept of surplus-repression, which denotes «the restrictions necessitated by social domination. This is distinguished from (basic) *repression*: the "modifications" of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization» [7, p. 44, emphasis in original]. The essence of repression lies in the suppression of the natural drives of Eros through its sublimation for the sake of the functioning of civilization. Surplus-repression, however, denotes an excessive suppression that goes beyond what is necessary, with the aim of preserving domination. H. Marcuse highlights as examples of surplus-repression «the modifications and deflections of instinctual energy necessitated by the perpetuation of the monogamic-patriarchal family, or by a hierarchical division of labor, or by public control over the individual's private existence…» [7, p. 46]. As a result, human naturalness is suppressed, and the individual's corporeality is transformed into an object of exploitation.

However, even the primary modification of instincts is not the result of an individual's will, but rather a forced measure: «his ability to alter reality consciously in accordance with ''what is useful'' seems to promise a gradual removal of extraneous barriers to his gratification. However, neither his desires nor his alteration of reality are henceforth his own…» [7, p. 31]. This process is conditioned by the way society is organized, which turns the objective necessity of survival into an instrument of domination and social subjugation. H. Marcuse writes: «If absence of repression is the archetype of freedom, then civilization is the struggle against this freedom» [7, p. 31]. This points to the totality of systemic pressure, which leaves no space for authentic self-expression, as society forms a type of rationality wherein the individuals begin to perceive the internalized demands of the system as their own desires.

The mechanism of establishing societal power over the individual is thoroughly described by M. Foucault, according to whom «in every society, the body was in the grip of very strict powers, which imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or obligations» [3, p. 136]. It concerns a network of disciplinary institutions, each of which mirrors the other: «by locking up, retraining and rendering docile, it merely reproduces, with a little more emphasis, all the mechanisms that are to be found in the social body… The prison is like a rather disciplined barracks, a strict school, a dark workshop, but not qualitatively different» [3, p. 233]. In fact, societies are composed of and regulated by a network of such institutions, which are designed to impart a standardized form to every person passing through them, turning the individual into a useful «docile» [3, p. 136] body.

Disciplinary power is exercised through practices designed to render individuals controllable and efficient by consistently depriving them of the right to free will, and consequently, to freedom. Turning to the ideas of E. Fromm, one can assume that as a result of submission to disciplinary power, individuals

achieve a form of «freedom from» the burden of uncertainty of estrangement from their nature, while simultaneously acquiring a sense of belonging to society through alienation as self-alienation. This mechanism can be conceptualized as a transcendence into a certain shared space through the radical devaluation of corporeality, reducing it to a set of functions.

The functioning of disciplinary power is consolidated by the phenomenon of punishment, which, as J.-B. de La Salle exhaustively defined, is «capable of making… feel the offense they have committed,… humiliating them,… confusing them:… a certain coldness,… indifference, a question, a humiliation, a removal from office» [cited in 3, p. 178]. At the same time, according to H. Marcuse, the function of control – and thus, it can be assumed, of punishment – is exercised by members of society over one another within the scope of the rights granted to them: «To the denial of freedom, even of the possibility of freedom, corresponds the granting of liberties where they strengthen the repression. The degree to which the population is allowed to break the peace… and silence, to be ugly and to uglify things, to ooze familiarity, to offend against good form is frightening. It is frightening because it expresses the lawful and even organized effort to reject the Other in his own right, to prevent autonomy even in a small, reserved sphere of existence» [8, p. 249].

Naturally, there is a fear and a desire to avoid sanctions, as a result of which disciplinary power becomes internalized. According to M. Foucault, this phenomenon is associated with Bentham's «Panopticon» [3, p. 201]: it is precisely the awareness of constant surveillance that enables the continuous and uninterrupted functioning of power over individuals. Thus, when there is in fact no external surveillance, individuals become their own monitors. Crucially, disciplinary control is exerted not only through the norms declared by institutions, but also in a latent dimension: through unwritten rules, informal hierarchy, and sanctions. M. Foucault argues that the penetration of disciplinary power into the minute details of human behavior is ensured by disciplinary micro-penalties: «of time (lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body ("incorrect" attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency)» [3, p. 178].

Micro-power deepens the self-evidence of human objectification and reveals its scale: «it was a question not of treating the body, en masse, "wholesale", as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it "retail", individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself – movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body» [3, pp. 136-137]. As a result, not only is the connection between mind and nature severed, but the integrity of the body is also disrupted: it is anatomized into its smallest parts, transformed into particles of a broader mechanism, making the restoration of its bond with nature entirely impossible. Consequently, corporeality turns out to be socially constrained, since its activity is regulated by disciplinary power; the latter, in turn, imperceptibly yet systematically shapes the admissible horizons of existence.

The internalization of the repression of instincts or of disciplinary power can be linked to the concept of habitus, introduced by P. Bourdieu: «*habitus*, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them» [2, p. 53, emphasis in original]. In other words, it is a set of enduring internal habits, patterns of thought, preferences, and modes of action that are formed within individuals throughout their life and automatically govern their behavior: «the *habitus* is an infinite capacity for generating products – thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions – whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production…» [2, p. 55, emphasis in original]. One can assume that the habitus is precisely the internal structure that assimilates, consolidates, and automatizes the demands of functional, socially oriented productivity within an individual's everyday behavior.

As a result of existing in a specific environment, the habitus reveals a certain dialectical tension: a change in conditions can lead to enrichment through new experience and, consequently, bring about the transformation of the habitus itself; at the same time, the durability of the disposition can

significantly complicate this process. P. Bourdieu mentions the possibility of a situation where «dispositions function out of phase and practices are objectively ill-adapted to the present conditions because they are objectively adjusted to conditions that no longer obtain» [2, p. 62].

The connection between the concept of habitus, H. Marcuse's surplus-repression, and M. Foucault's disciplinary practices is substantiated by the following: «As an acquired system of generative schemes, the *habitus* makes possible the free production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the particular conditions of its production – and only those. Through the *habitus*, the structure of which it is the product governs practice, not along the paths of a mechanical determinism, but within the constraints and limits initially set on its inventions» [2, p. 55, emphasis in original]. The structure described by P. Bourdieu is a system that indirectly dominates individuals, defining both the content and form of their practices. Given the origin of such practices and their orientation toward reproducing this system, they can be defined as sociocultural.

However, crucial to this study will be the articulation of the possibility of a reverse mechanism: the transformation of individual and group practices is capable of exerting a feedback effect on the structure itself. Furthermore, it can be assumed that it is precisely through the alteration of these practices that shifts in the sociocultural dimension of the system's being become possible. A change in practices can occur both as a consequence of new social conditions that force people to adapt and form new behavioral patterns, and as a result of critical reflexivity, which enables the self to recognize its own behavioral patterns and step outside of unconscious subordination to them. At the same time, practices engendered by the awakening of self-awareness, the actualization of the personal principle, and the pursuit of «freedom to» in its integrity and individuality are appropriately defined as existential. While P. Bourdieu emphasizes the durable and pre-reflective nature of habitus, this study posits that transformative reflexivity, induced by the individual's recognition of freedom as the supreme value, can destabilize automated dispositional patterns, opening space for existential practices.

Etymologically and conceptually, existential practices as a term traces back to M. Heidegger's fundamental analytic of Dasein, particularly to his proposed distinction between existentials and categories. Comprehending human being as a being-there or presence rather than merely material presence-at-hand, he notes: «we call the characteristic ways in which being-there *is*: *existentials*… Existentials and categories are the two basic possibilities for characterizing the being of beings. The being corresponding to each requires a distinctive manner of primary examination: a being is either a *who* (ex-sistence) or a *what* (on-handness, in the broadest sense)» [6, p. 55, emphasis in original].

Applying the idea of existentials in a broader heuristic framework is methodically justified: while sociocultural practices tend to reduce individual functioning to the objectified logic of categories, existential practices engage the ontological structure of human existence in its authentic mode. They are aimed not at constructing new existential structures, but at changing the mode of realization of immanent existentials, transferring them from an inauthentic state of subordination to the system into a mode of authentic self-determination. Unlike sociocultural practices, such practices are directed not toward adaptation or confirming one's belonging to the system, but toward gaining independence, revealing an authentic identity, as well as achieving creative, holistic, and spontaneous self-realization in the spiritual, psychic and corporeal dimensions of human existence. It is precisely spontaneity, in E. Fromm's understanding, that allows one to overcome alienation from one's nature and self-alienation, to actualize the principle of personhood, and to attain constructive positive freedom. Ultimately, this constitutes the fundamental task, for, as the Ukrainian philosopher N. Khamitov noted, «freedom is a basic human existential… this existential is pivotal to all others. Dread, loneliness, despair, hope, faith, and love all become possible only on the condition that the individual is free» [1, p. 136].

The liberating will to freedom can be linked to the imagination, which, according to H. Marcuse, «retains the structure and the tendencies of the psyche prior to its organization by the reality…» [7, p. 120]. It is reasonable to assume that the idea of freedom engenders a dream of it, which ultimately can prompt a corresponding volitional intention. It is at this point that reflexivity and existential practices become possible.

It is crucial to assume that the actualization of authentic existence is possible not only on the personal level, but also on collective and systemic levels. In particular, H. Marcuse expressed his own conception of the possibility of an organization of civilization that does not repress human nature: «The civilized morality is reversed by harmonizing instinctual freedom and order: liberated from the tyranny of repressive reason, the instincts tend toward free and lasting existential relations…» [7, p. 161]. Such an approach blurs the boundary between the individual and the collective, demonstrating that the overcoming of self-alienation can signify not merely a private practice of an isolated subject, but a potential impulse for the reorganization of the entire system.

Furthermore, a non-repressive system has the potential to form an order that is an alternative to the prevailing order, yet naturally conditioned. In particular, while under conditions of repression Eros, as one of the primary human drives, is reduced to sexuality – which is merely its component – in the absence of suppression, according to H. Marcuse, the opposite process takes place: «With the transformation from sexuality into Eros, the life instincts evolve their sensuous order, while reason becomes sensuous to the degree to which it comprehends and organizes necessity in terms of protecting and enriching the life instincts» [7, p. 179].

The difference between the existing repressive order and the vision of a non-repressive alternative becomes obvious: reason, endowed with sensuousness, ceases to be an instrument of coercion and rationalized control. Instead, it transforms into an organ for harmonizing and nurturing human life forces. On the individual level, such a prospect appears entirely realistic; however, the question of the conditions and mechanisms of altering the form of the entire civilizational organization requires further investigation.

Conclusions. By drawing upon H. Marcuse's interpretations of Freudian metapsychology, M. Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power, P. Bourdieu's concept of habitus, and E. Fromm's distinction between the phenomenon of positive «freedom to» and negative «freedom from», the role of practices in human existence within the context of their immersion in the system, the mechanisms of their influence, as well as their origin, were conceptualized. It was determined that as a result of an individual's formation in society, they are characterized by practices designed to root them in the system; such practices were designated as sociocultural due to their origin in culture and their simultaneous orientation toward society. E. Fromm's concept allowed us to demonstrate that sociocultural practices emerge as a consequence of the escape from negative freedom: in freeing themselves from the power of instincts, human beings find themselves in a state of disorientation caused by the severing of their primary bond with nature. Consequently, they escape from this freedom, characterized by loneliness and isolation, and fall under the power of the system, becoming fully alienated from their nature, which turns into self-alienation.

In contrast to sociocultural practices, the concept of existential practices was proposed, grounded in the vector of positive «freedom to». These practices are designed to overcome this self-alienation through spontaneous creative activity and the unfolding of the individual's authentic potential. From an ontological perspective, informed by M. Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein, existential practices counteract the objectifying logic of categories embedded in sociocultural practices. They enable individuals to transcend systemic subordination by shifting the enactment of their immanent existentials into a conscious, authentic mode of being. While H. Marcuse addresses this emancipation through the reconciliation of reason and instinctual nature, M. Heidegger's ontology provides the structural foundation for this transition as a shift from inauthentic conformity to authentic self-determination.

It was determined that a change in practices can demonstrate mechanisms of self-organization in society and occur naturally as a result of shifts in the conditions that shape them. However, it was posited that existential practices specifically are driven by transformative reflexivity and the re-evaluation of behavioral patterns, arising from the awareness of freedom as the supreme value. At the same time, existential practices are closely linked to the concept of the person, as they constitute practices of «spontaneity» in E. Fromm's understanding. Given that an essential component of the state of spontaneity, according to the philosopher, is the reconciliation of reason with nature, existential practices can be comprehended as overcoming alienation as self-alienation through integrating one's nature.

This entails the equal cultivation of the spiritual, psychic, and corporeal dimensions of being, enabling individuals to overcome unconscious subordination to internalized disciplinary demands and restore their own integrity. Simultaneously, it is plausible to assume that such practices can be termed practices of self-creation, for their anticipated result is the creation of an individual identity from the depths of personal potential.

It was also established that the problem of personal freedom in the contemporary democratic world stems from the radical rationalization of all spheres of human life, which causes the devaluation of corporeality and the aforementioned rupture between reason and nature. However, the possibility of a reverse influence of existential practices on sociocultural conditions is assumed, wherein the transformation of individual and group behavioral models, generated by the awakening of self-awareness and the drive toward «freedom to», is capable of precipitating shifts in the ontic structure of the system. Since freedom acts as a basic existential that makes all others possible, it is precisely existential practices that emerge as an instrument for disclosing an authentic identity and potentially achieving positive freedom on a systemic level. The assumption was advanced that the initial impulse for existential practices stems from the imagination, which, while preserving the primary structure of the psyche prior to its systemic rationalization, generates a dream of freedom and prompts a corresponding volitional intention.

In H. Marcuse's vision of a non-repressive order, this process unfolds as a transformation of sexuality into Eros, which converts repressive reason into «sensuous reason», tasked not with controlling, but with enriching the life instincts. Thus, existential practices emerge as an instrument for harmonizing reason and nature, creating ontological prerequisites for the reorganization of the entire system, although the concrete mechanisms of this civilizational transformation remain an open question that warrants further investigation.

Information on the use of artificial intelligence. During the preparation of this work, the author used Gemini in order to improve language.

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ПРАКТИЧНІ ВИМІРИ СВОБОДИ ОСОБИСТОСТІ: МІЖ САМО-ВІДЧУЖЕННЯМ І АВТЕНТИЧНІСТЮ

Актуальність проблеми *свободи особистості зумовлена системною кризою людського буття, де глобалізаційні, цифрові та соціокультурні трансформації посилюють тиск на автономію індивіда. Сучасне суспільство створює м'які механізми дисциплінування та контролю, які непомітно інтерналізуються людиною й призводять до її само-відчуження.* ***Мета дослідження*** *– осмислити свободу як сукупність практик, спрямованих на вихід із-під впливу соціокультурного середовища, подолання само-відчуження й розкриття особистісного потенціалу в автентичному модусі буття.* ***Методологічну*** *базу становить аналіз дисциплінарної влади М. Фуко, ідеї Г. Маркузе про надмірне пригнічення інстинктів у суспільстві, поняття габітусу П. Бурдьє та розрізнення "свободи для" й "свободи від" Е. Фромма. Евристично цінною для розмежування неавтентичного та автентичного модусів буття є концепція екзистенціалів М. Гайдеґґера, яка задає онтологічну рамку, в якій автентичний вимір Dasein співвідноситься з актуалізацією особистості. Методологічно важливими були визначення свободи Г. В. Ф. Гегеля, а також її осмислення Н. Хамітовим як вузлового екзистенціалу. В* ***результаті дослідження*** *з'ясовано, що соціокультурні практики укорінюють індивіда в системному порядку як механізм втечі від негативної «свободи від»: уникаючи дезорієнтації через втрату органічного зв'язку з природою, людина підпадає під зовнішній контроль і зазнає самовідчуження. На противагу їм, екзистенціальні практики спираються на позитивну «свободу для» і долають це відчуження через спонтанну творчу активність. Відповідно до онтології М. Гайдеґґера, вони дозволяють індивіду подолати домінування системи, трансформуючи спосіб його буття з неавтентичного в модус автентичного. Екзистенціальні практики можуть бути результатом трансформаційної рефлексії та переосмислення поведінкових шаблонів. Як практики «спонтанності», вони долають розрив між розумом і натурою, відновлюючи цілісність людини через рівноправне культивування її духовного, душевного й тілесного вимірів. Висунуто припущення, що будучи практиками самотворення, екзистенціальні практики здатні здійснювати зворотний трансформаційний вплив на соціокультурні умови, уможливлюючи досягнення позитивної свободи й на системному рівні.*

Ключові слова: *свобода особистості, воля, екзистенціальні практики, екзистенціал, соціокультурні практики, дисциплінарна влада, автентичність, свобода від, свобода для, габітус.*

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